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Abstract: This paper introduces a method of analysing learning situations, 
based on the work of Karl Popper, and applies it to some examples of software-
based teaching innovations. The basis of Popperian analysis is identification of 
processes of discontinuous trial-and-improvement of “strategic theories” 
(students’ conjectured constructions of some sort of reality) under the selection 
pressures provided by “concerns” (problems of special interest to the student). 
It requires us to examine the mechanisms by which teachers’ target problems 
become students’ concerns; the mechanisms by which students improve upon 
their existing strategic theories in the direction of target theories; and the 
encouragement given to the raising of new problems. The examples considered 
include a CD-ROM on natural selection, a CD-ROM on the work of Homer, a 
tool for supporting the learning of formal reasoning, a negotiation simulation, 
and SimCity. 
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1 Introduction 
There is a danger of a bifurcation in the world of educational ICT, between evaluations 
and research studies. Evaluations tend to employ a pragmatic, eclectic mix of methods to 
examine the practical effectiveness of new technologies for learning and teaching in 
particular subject areas. Research studies, meanwhile, draw on a plethora of theoretical 
traditions to examine a wider variety of research questions. Evaluations tend to be 
atheoretical and focus on effectiveness in particular cases; research studies incline 
towards generality and theoretical understanding. 
This bifurcation is not necessarily seen as problematic: Typically, the audience for 
evaluations wants to know, bluntly, if the technology works, and is not greatly concerned 
about what might be seen as esoteric concepts of questionable practical relevance; the 
audience for research studies, on the other hand, typically wants to know about how the 
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empirical situations illuminate theoretical notions and their domain of application rather 
than about a catalogue of functional details. 
However, the risk with such a bifurcation is that evaluations may be so focused on the 
context – the students’ prior knowledge, the learning activities, the design of the 
particular technology, the topic-specific aims of the educators, the way the technology is 
used with students, and the detailed learning outcomes – that one may end up being able 
to say lots of things about practical effectiveness in the particular case except why it 
might be effective in principle. Vary the technological or educational context slightly, 
and the evaluation might not be able to predict how things will be different without 
further extensive empirical work. 
This paper introduces a theoretically-based method of analysing learning situations 
that, it will be argued, can enable us to devise and evaluate suggested enhancements to 
educational ICT. 
The paper begins by outlining the theoretical beginnings of the method, which has 
Popper’s problem-solving schema at its core. This schema is then illustrated using the 
Galapagos CD-ROM, software that introduces Darwin’s work on natural selection. 
Elaborations of the Popperian psychological perspective follow, introducing the ideas of 
“strategic theories”, “concerns” and “pedagogical learning mechanisms”. These ideas are 
illustrated using the Galapagos software and four further packages. The analysis is then 
used to structure discussions about potential enhancements to the software, and to 
illustrate how evaluations might in principle be extended to provide more robust evidence 
about the reasons underpinning the effectiveness of software. 
2 Popperian Epistemology 
The framework introduced here is based on a psychological extension of the work of Karl 
Popper. 
Popper is probably best known for his 1945 political book The Open Society and Its 
Enemies, and his 1972 book Objective Knowledge, but his work on the epistemology of 
science goes back to the early 1930s. Years before the Kuhnian movement, Popper 
persuaded many that science develops by the overturning of established ideas rather than 
by some gradual accretion of unchallengeable facts; that it is impossible to obtain 
knowledge that is certain; and that we should be critical of sources of authority because 
they are theory-laden and fallible (Popper, 1934). 
Popper argued that knowledge is conjectural (Popper, 1963), and that it grows 
through criticism and testing rather than through justification and induction. He was also 
an early philosophical advocate of the idea that “knowledge” in the public sense comes 
about through complex intersubjective processes, which we would now recognise more 
obviously through Vygotsky. However, Popper emphasises the role of empirical testing 
of hypotheses in scientific discovery, rather than of subjective processes or of ideologies. 
Moreover, Popper is neither a relativist nor a sceptic. He provides a plausible account 
of the pursuit of knowledge that exploits two ideas that have fallen out of favour in these 
post-modern times. The first is realism – the idea that there is a shared reality, but which 
is perceived in different ways; the second is the correspondence theory of truth—the idea 
that a statement is true if, and only if, it corresponds to reality. What has to be done in 
analysing the validity of claims, he argues, is to test claims rather than seek their sources. 
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Although we can never know if we have found the truth, there is the potential to discover 
error. 
For a good introduction to the application of Popper’s epistemology to educational 
research, see Swann (2003). Meanwhile, Bailey (2000) considers a number of 
applications of Popperian ideas to educational practice. We focus here on psychological 
aspects of how students come to know. 
2.1 A Popperian Psychological Perspective 
The commonsense theory of commonsense knowledge is called by Popper the “bucket 
theory of the mind”: we open our eyes, prick up our ears, and information streams into 
the mind, accumulating and then being digested as knowledge. He argues that this theory 
is completely mistaken, and yet exerts a powerful influence on some theories of teaching, 
particularly the behaviourist notion of conditioning. Knowledge is treated as consisting of 
“thing-like” elements (ideas, impressions, sense data) in us, which we passively receive 
(unless we actively create error by interfering with or “going beyond” these given 
elements); higher level knowledge establishes itself by the repetitive association of these 
elements. 
Opposed to this, “As children we learn to decode the chaotic messages which meet us 
from our environment. We learn to sift them, to ignore the majority of them, and to single 
out those which are of biological importance for us either at once, or in a future for which 
we are being prepared by a process of maturation.” (Popper, 1972, p. 63). This learning 
“consists of the modification (possibly the rejection) of some form of knowledge, or 
disposition, which was there previously; and in the last instance, of inborn dispositions.” 
(ibid., p. 71). Moreover, this modification does not occur by passive, steady, repetitive 
accumulation of information, but it “always proceeds by the method of trial and error” 
(ibid., p. 242). That is, we somehow jump to a theory and then test it in the hope of 
getting nearer to the truth. 
This picture, of individuals engaged in active processes of decoding and sifting, is 
familiar from the Piagetian tradition that emphasises the role of consciousness rather than 
natural development. However, Popper emphasises, arguably more vigorously than 
Piaget, that individuals modify their existing theories only by creative, conjectural, 
discontinuous trial-and-error-elimination. 
“We do not discover new facts or new effects by copying them, or by inferring 
them inductively from observation, or by any other method of instruction by 
the environment” (Popper, 1994, p. 9) 
Moreover, Popper asserts that all learning is a kind of problem-solving, in which 
attempts to resolve mismatches between expectations and evidence are crucial. 
In order to fully understand Popper’s view of psychology, one has to appreciate his 
distinction between three worlds (Popper, 1972). World 1 is the physical world, of stick 
and stones, elephants and bones. World 2 is the subjective world of our conscious 
experiences, thoughts and desires, hopes and fears. World 3 is the world of knowledge in 
the public sense: “theories published in journals and books and stored in libraries; 
discussions of such theories; difficulties or problems pointed out in connection with such 
theories; and so on.” (p. 73). World 3 arises from World 2 but has an autonomous 
existence, in that it can be criticised and developed by anyone who has access to it. 
Unlike Plato’s world of forms, World 3 is a product of intersubjective human endeavour, 
and so changes over time. World 3 includes arithmetic, gravity, astrology, the Iliad, 
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Beethoven’s Fifth, democracy, totalitarianism, and social class. It contains false theories 
as well as true, contested theories as well as accepted theories, problems, and arguments. 
Popper argued strongly that what someone learns is heavily dependent on prior 
theories “of persons, places, things, linguistic usages, social conventions, and so on”. For 
our purposes, we can see these World 3 theories as including not just the accepted canon 
of past thinkers’ work but also the individual community’s locally produced knowledge. 
This provides a second link to Vygotsky, and one that will be explored later in the paper. 
Psychological processes, then, are analysed in terms of World 3 objects. 
“I suggest that one day we will have to revolutionize psychology by looking at 
the human mind as an organ for interacting with the objects of World 3; for 
understanding them, contributing to them, participating in them; and for 
bringing them to bear on World 1.” (Popper, 1972, p. 156) 
“Understanding a theory”, in Popper’s view, is understanding the problems it intends 
to solve and understanding why other solutions fail (“All life is problem solving”). He 
provides a simplified problem-solving schema to illustrate this: 
 
P1 → TT → EE → P2 
 
Figure 1: Popper's basic problem-solving schema 
P1 is a shared problem-situation from which we start, and which incorporates 
background theories. TT is a tentative theory, an imaginative conjectural solution to the 
problem. EE is error-elimination, involving critical discussion or experimental tests; and 
P2 is the resulting problem-situation. 
Note that the most basic schema has been represented here, in order to introduce the 
key relationships, but the schemas become a lot more elaborate than this. For example, it 
would be a good idea to propose as many theories as we can to solve a given problem, 
then each of these tentative solutions should be critically examined in a variety of ways. 
Each of these attempts at error-elimination may give rise to several new and interesting 
problems: 
 
P
TT TT TT TT 
EE EE EE EE EE EE EE EE EE 
P P P P P P P P P P 
Figure 2: A more elaborate problem-solving schema 
Popper introduced such schemas to illustrate arguments relating to World 3, and he 
himself did not explore these processes much further in psychological terms. Others have, 
however, taken this agenda forward. 
Before we explore elaborations of the psychological perspective, an illustration of the 
simplified problem-solving schema might be helpful. 
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2.2 Illustration of Popper’s problem-solving schema: Galapagos CD-ROM 
The Galapagos CD-ROM was used in The Open University’s Science Foundation Course 
(course code S103), to introduce some basic ideas in evolution by natural selection, 
although not to teach the theory directly. The main aim is to introduce students to some 
of the observation and note-taking skills often used in fieldwork, relating these skills to 
Darwin’s work in the Galapagos Islands in the 19th century. 
 
Figure 3: Screenshot from the Galapagos CD-ROM 
The analysis here makes use of the accounts of the software in Taylor, Oliver, & 
Hatzipanagos (1995), Taylor, Sumner & Law (1997), Whitelock (1998), and Freake & 
Lawless (2001). Clearly there is much more known about the software (its aims and 
functionality, how it is used with students, and the outcomes of evaluations) than can be 
represented in the space available here. Inevitably the descriptions of the software, its 
educational context, and its evaluations are going to be rather terse. However, the purpose 
of this paper is to illustrate, roughly, how a particular analytical method can be applied, 
not to provide a complete account of the software. 
What does the software enable students to do? 
• Experience something of the Galapagos Islands (photographs, video, text, etc.), in 
relation to Darwin’s observations there. 
• Carry out scientific fieldwork tasks in a structured way: 
 Make choices about where to observe (pan & zoom) 
 Identify and categorise finches using a field guide. 
 Make systematic notes. 
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Figure 4: Some activities in the Galapagos CD-ROM 
This virtual fieldtrip has a number of advantages: it is more involving than text or a 
museum exhibit (one student described how the videos seemed to “bring the subject to 
life”); it is less expensive and time-consuming than travelling to the islands; it removes 
the risk of not observing a range of species; it allows observation of the conditions that 
pertained at a previous point in time (e.g. Darwin’s expedition); and it focuses students’ 
attention on the variables that are important for this particular course. It has the 
disadvantage that students do not obtain experience of the messiness, practical 
techniques, or fortuitous opportunities of physical fieldwork. 
Preliminary Popperian Analysis 
A number of problems could be identified here, based on the learning objectives 
associated with the use of the CD-ROM in the course. We could also choose to focus on 
the pedagogical problem of the advantages and disadvantages of this CD-ROM over 
fieldtrips or museum visits; or on the curriculum problem of what observation and note-
taking skills are valuable on fieldtrips looking at biological adaptation; or on other 
problems. 
In this paper, we will focus just on the problem of whether one species of finch arrive 
on the islands or multiple species, although you could equally analyse the other problems: 
P: Did one species of finch arrive on the islands or multiple 
species? 
The theory (TT) under consideration, then, is that one species of finch originally 
arrived on the island, and that evolution alone accounts for the diversity of species 
observed by Darwin and the S103 students. 
The error-elimination (EE) to which this theory is subjected in the course does not 
pretend to be in any way comprehensive (this course is at first-year undergraduate level, 
and endeavours to serve as a general introduction to studying science at university): it 
involves collecting information about the finch species, habitat and feeding habits; 
classifying finches into species; recording information on a spreadsheet; identifying total 
numbers of species and subspecies; and counting up how many are endemic to each 
island group. But this limited activity overtly brings in new problems (P2) of how species 
are adapted to the environment; how changing conditions can lead to adaptation; the 
limitations of this kind of observational approach; and concepts such as ecosystems, food 
chains and energy transfer levels. 
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So far, then, the Popperian analysis of the Galapagos CD-ROM has solely consisted 
of identifying a basic problem-situation, and candidates for the components (P, TT, EE, 
P2) of the problem-solving schema. This has not told us much. The next step is to 
hypothesise how students might progress through this schema: how they might grasp the 
problem (P) and the theory (TT), how they might learn the specifics of putting theories to 
the test (EE), and how they might learn from this error-elimination by formulating new 
problems (P2). To take this next step, a number of ideas need to be introduced, learning 
the idea of “pedagogical learning mechanisms”. So we return to the analysis of the 
Galapagos CD-ROM later in the paper. 
3 Strategic Theories and Concerns 
What follows are elaborations of the Popperian psychological perspective, and although 
the adjective “Popperian” remains, the terminology and development of the ideas are not 
to be found explicitly in Popper’s work. The terminology has been introduced to simplify 
the presentation of the ideas. 
Donald T. Campbell offers a sketch of a process called “Blind-Variation-and-
Selective-Retention” (BVSR) which is modelled on evolution by natural selection, and 
which can be seen as an extension of Popperian ideas to creative thought (Campbell, 
1960). 
By analogy with evolution by natural selection, BVSR requires: 
(i) a mechanism for introducing variation (the variations being thought trials); 
(ii) a consistent selection pressure; 
(iii) a mechanism for preserving and reproducing the selected variations. 
 
The connection between BVSR and Popper’s view of learning can be made explicit: 
Firstly, in line with Popperian psychology, the “variations” of BVSR can be identified 
with World 2 theories. In order to distinguish (when necessary) between World 3 theories 
and World 2 theories, the term “strategic theory” has been introduced (Aczel, 1998) to 
refer to World 2 theories. This is appropriate, because the word “theory” in a World 2 
sense is intended to label a student’s conjectured constructions, expectations, 
dispositions, or assumptions (articulated or not), of some sort of reality in a particular 
context; and there is a “strategic” nature to these theories in that they solve problems. 
Conversely, a strategy can be considered as theoretical, in a sense, in that it incorporates 
expectations about some state of affairs. Note that a student’s strategic theory is a 
personal construction (rather than a direct record of reality), but one which is potentially 
at odds with what is there. Following William James, one could see these products of the 
human mind in instrumental terms, as adaptations to reality. Therefore, in contrast with 
some phenomenographers, this perspective allows some strategic theories to be seen as 
“better” than other strategic theories. 
Secondly, the “selection process” of BVSR can be characterised (following the 
Popperian model of understanding outlined above) as a World 2 problem of special 
interest to the individual. Because the word “problem” is being used in a technical sense, 
the term “concern” has been introduced as a label (Aczel, 1998). Concerns would include 
desires, motivations and fears; in short, anything that exerts a psychological selection 
pressure on the formation of theories. A concern is a World 2 construction like a strategic 
theory, is usually unstated, and is what we as researchers might conjecture is engaging 
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students’ minds during a period of time. They incorporate what cognitive scientists might 
call the “student’s problem-situation model”. 
So, with respect to World 2, we will talk about “strategic theories” and “concerns”, 
and learning is portrayed in terms of processes of discontinuous trial-and-improvement of 
strategic theories under the selection pressures provided by concerns. 
3.1 Comparison with other approaches 
It might be helpful, before moving on to consider examples of these processes, to 
consider how these ideas relate to other approaches to thinking about learning. 
Campbell argues that BVSR is “fundamental to… all genuine increases in knowledge, 
to all increases in fit of system to environment.” (Campbell, 1960, p. 380). Even 
mechanisms that shortcut BVSR have themselves been originally achieved by BVSR. 
Campbell also argues that such shortcut mechanisms still involve BVSR at some level, 
although this will not be assumed here. 
Campbell notes that the BVSR model of thought… 
“… joins the Gestaltists in protest against the picture of the learning organism 
as a passive induction machine accumulating contingencies. Instead, an active 
generation and checking of thought-trials… is envisaged. … Poincaré’s (1913) 
aesthetic criteria and the Gestalt qualities of wholeness, symmetry, organised 
structure, and the like can be regarded as built-in selective criteria completely 
compatible with the model.” (p. 389) 
However, unlike the Gestaltists, strategic theories do not spring fully formed into 
being: 
“While ‘insight’ is accepted as a phenomenal counterpart of the successful 
completion of a perhaps unconscious blind-variation cycle, its status as an 
explanatory concept is rejected, especially as it connotes ‘direct’ ways of 
knowing.” (p. 390) 
Campbell decries the deification of “the creative genius to whom we impute a 
capacity for direct insight instead of mental flounderings and blind-alley entrances of the 
kind we are aware typify our own thought processes” (p. 391). However, he also lists four 
ways in which thinkers may be expected to differ, according to the BVSR model: 
1. The accuracy of representations of World 1. 
2. The number and range of variations in thought trials produced. 
3. The accuracy and number of selective criteria. 
4. The ability to retain solutions. 
Of course there are difficulties with the model: Firstly, Campbell himself notes a 
number of reasons why it is difficult to test. Secondly, the exact nature of the 
“mechanism for introducing variation” and the “mechanism for preserving and 
reproducing the selected variations” are left as mysterious (although it does not affect the 
analysis). Thirdly, it is not clear to what extent the “shortcut mechanisms” Campbell 
describes might be more influential in practice than simple BVSR. 
Nevertheless, we can speculate that variation could be introduced by something like 
analogical reasoning (Rumelhart & Norman, 1981), which would enable students to 
identify similarities of problem structure; and that memory processes play a crucial role 
in preserving and reproducing strategic theories between problems. 
It is worth drawing attention to some of the characteristics of strategic theories, to 
help delineate the similarities and dissimilarities with, for example, Bartlett’s schemata 
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(Bartlett, 1958), the cognitive structures of Piaget or Bruner, Schank’s scripts (e.g. 
Schank, 1982), the productions of ACT* (Anderson, 1983), or Sweller’s schema (e.g. 
Sweller et al., 1983). 
A strategic theory is implicit and unarticulated because the knower is perhaps rarely 
aware of more than a small part of it at any one time and it cannot be transferred directly 
from one person to another. It is also imprecise because it is not concrete or formulated in 
logical terms (unlike the typical mental model of Johnson-Laird, 1983); and although it 
was constructed in response to a particular concern, and is therefore contextual, the 
vagueness of its construction might help transfer between concerns. There are 
assumptions built into strategic theories, and we can discover new things in them that we 
did not realize by means of reflection. Although strategic theories can quickly fade if they 
do not play a role in everyday living, they can linger. They can involve action, or they 
might only involve thought. 
It is likely for there to be commonalities between different people’s strategic theories 
because they have tackled similar problems in the past. In particular, it might be 
reasonable to suggest (following Kant) that human physiological development has a very 
strong early influence on the propensity to construct certain theories - for example for 
space, time, quantity, quality and relation - that might then act as templates or constraints 
on future constructions. 
Language, culture and tools are clearly foremost aspects of World 3, and they may 
very well form part of the background theory to problem situations, or they may be the 
subject of theorising. However they also may have additional roles to play in the analysis. 
For instance, language is used to describe some shared reality, and to argue about the 
difference between descriptions of that reality and observations of that reality. Tools, too, 
have a special role to play in the analysis. They can facilitate the formulation of 
problems, the creation of theories and the conduct of error-elimination. Finally, as we 
have seen, social interaction is central: It provides the participation in shared problem 
situations that is so often the medium for learning, and the intersubjectivity that enables 
World 2 to produce World 3. But more than this, the socially-produced World 3 
constitutes a reality that frames learning.  
Concerns, meanwhile, include anxieties about social and technological interactions, 
and about personal failure. They include attitudes, dispositions, desires and motivations. 
There is no reason to suppose their character is very different to that of strategic theories, 
as outlined above, except that emotion and purpose play a much strong role. 
We return now to consider the processes by which World 2 strategic theories are 
constructed as a consequence of concerns. 
4 The notion of pedagogical learning mechanisms 
To illustrate how these processes work, the simplified problem-solving schema can be 
converted into pedagogical terms… 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    James Aczel    
 
P1 → TT → EE → P2
c1 st ee c2
World 3 
World 2 
 
Figure 5: Pedagogical extension of the basic problem-solving schema 
A student has a concern (c1), conjectures a strategic theory (st) to address the concern, 
subjects it to some sort of error-elimination (ee), and the concern is altered, not least 
simply by virtue of having engaged in the investigation of the original concern. 
Now in educational endeavours, there are very often particular problems with which 
teachers intend their students to engage (“target problems”). So we might consider how 
students grasp such problems and make them their own. There are also typically ideas, 
frameworks, themes, and the like with which students are expected to gain familiarity 
(“target theories”). So we might consider how students grasp these theories.  
The term “pedagogical learning mechanisms”, then, refers to the “how” of the 
grasping: the means by which teachers’ target problems become students’ concerns; the 
means by which students improve upon their existing strategic theories in the direction of 
target theories; the means by which students come to appreciate appropriate error-
elimination in the subject domain; and the encouragement given to the raising of new 
problems. 
The essence of Popperian analysis of learning scenarios is to ask questions such as: 
→ P What are the target problems (P1), if any, with which teachers intend their 
students to engage? By what means can the target problems become concerns? 
(→c1 and P1 ~ c1) Successful mechanisms here would take account 
(deliberately or not) of students’ existing concerns (including what might 
motivate them) and background knowledge. 
→ TT What are the target theories (TT), if any, which teachers intend their students to 
grasp? By what means can students grasp target theories? (c1→st and TT ~ st) 
Successful mechanisms here would take account (deliberately or not) of 
students’ typical theories and difficulties in relation to the problem situation. 
→ EE How are students supported in appreciating how theories are put to the test 
(EE) in this subject domain? This entails taking account of shared knowledge 
practices. Successful mechanisms here would encourage autonomous EE, and 
provide feedback to help students improve on their theories. 
→ P’ And how are students encouraged to pose new problems? 
4.1 Comparison with other approaches 
Figure 5 suggests two types of learning mechanisms. For example, looking at the 
question of how target problems can become concerns, there are two routes: →c1 and 
P1 ~ c1 (horizontal and vertical processes). The first entails explicitly starting with 
students’ existing concerns and knowledge, and encouraging students towards something 
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like P1; the second type of mechanism involves a more direct approach resembling 
“telling”. 
Similarly, in relation to the question of how students can grasp target theories, there 
again appear to be two types of mechanism suggested by Figure 5: c1 → st and TT ~ st. 
The first entails paying attention to students’ typical struggles with the particular problem 
situation, and finding ways to encourage students to improve upon their existing strategic 
theories in the direction of target theories, to address the problem c1; the second type of 
mechanism focuses on explaining the target theory TT but not necessarily relating it to 
the problem P1. 
This paper will not be exploring this possible distinction much further, however it is 
important to point out that although it might be possible to see parallels here with the 
alleged dichotomies between student-centred, discovery learning on the one hand versus 
teacher-centred, “chalk-and-talk” teaching on the other, it is the Popperian case that even 
in the latter situation, students are learning by active construction. At no time are students 
simply “absorbing” knowledge. 
As Popper (1972) puts it: 
“We learn about our environment not through being instructed by it, but 
through being challenged by it.” (p. 266) 
Another way (not overtly Popperian) of looking at Figure 5 is to see the World 3 
processes as a much-simplified model of the epistemology of a social practice, and the 
World 2 processes as how the apprentice participates in that practice’s epistemology. The 
vertical processes then constitute initiation or enculturation into the practice’s 
epistemology. Again, this perspective is not explored much further here. 
It is possible to relate learning mechanisms to the “layered analytical framework” of 
Taylor et al (1997) for describing educational software. Their first level (“educational 
aims”) corresponds to target World 3 objects (TT, P1, EE) as defined by the syllabus and 
the needs of the student population. Taylor et al’s second and third levels (“teaching 
strategies” and “task semantics”) have similarities with learning mechanisms, in that the 
teacher’s pedagogical approach, the range of student activity and the support provided by 
learning resources (such as books or educational software) largely comprise the means by 
which World 3 objects are grasped. 
Taylor et al consider three categories for analyzing such support: (1) techniques for 
promoting reflection, (2) structuring devices helping learners through tasks, and (3) 
methods for keeping learners motivated. Popperian analysis would not refer to 
“reflection” as such, but the World 2 horizontal arrows in Figure 5 suggest where creative 
student thought would take place (c1 → st, st → ee, ee → c2). “Motivation”, meanwhile, 
is an important aspect of developing concerns (→c1) and can draw on mechanisms such 
as authenticity, relevance, fun, pacing, and achievement. 
In simple terms, then, Popperian analysis invites us to consider the following 
questions: 
→ P What are the mechanisms by which target problems become concerns? 
→ T What are the mechanisms by which students improve upon their existing 
strategic theories in the direction of target theories? 
→ EE How are students supported in comprehending error-elimination appropriate to 
the subject domain? 
→ P' How are students encouraged to pose new problems? 
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We now consider these questions in relation to the Galapagos CD-ROM and other 
software. 
5 Illustration of learning mechanisms 
5.1 Galapagos CD-ROM 
→ P The software attempts to make the problem of Darwin’s finches into students’ 
concerns by means of introductory videos that provide an historical context to 
Darwin’s work, and readings from Darwin’s journal; by stunning photos; by 
highlighting Darwin’s mistakes; and by alternating watching and reading with 
practical activities. 
 A potential weakness of these →P mechanisms is that the software allows the 
student little leeway in formulating the problem: the student cannot start with 
the problem of how different species of finches could evolve, for example, or 
choose to study turtles instead of finches. However, one can understand the 
designers’ decision to restrict problem formulation in this way, to minimise the 
complexity for students new to degree-level study. 
→ T The software encourages students to develop a theory about the finches by 
means of a strong narrative line; by asking questions to encourage students to 
pay attention to the narrative; by episodic structured tasks that lead towards 
desired conclusions; by giving students a small element of control over what 
they can learn about and in what order; and by enabling students to construct 
their own classifications of birds. Arguably the strongest encouragement 
comes from multiple choice questions that require students to make inferences: 
i.e. to use their theories to make testable predictions. For example, students are 
asked to predict the effects of specific climatic changes on finches’ beak size 
and their population size. It might be argued that students would be more 
likely to both understand and remember theories derived by themselves than 
directly explained by others. 
 In terms of potential weaknesses in these →T mechanisms, the software 
countenances only a limited range of theories, presumably in order to guide 
students towards the target theories. The evaluations, it should be noted, do not 
set out to provide insight into how the software might take into account 
students’ prior theories or their typical difficulties with target theories.  
→ EE The students are given structured tasks to do. They are asked to compare their 
own classifications of birds with those of 19th and 20th century researchers; and 
are also asked to consider why 19th and 20th bird classifications are different, 
encouraging them to consider how methods of testing theories change. 
 A potential weakness of these →EE mechanisms is, as with →P and →T, their 
constrained nature. In addition, while one of the formative evaluations 
revealed students’ difficulties in handling data in an external program (a 
finding that led the necessary data analysis functionality to be incorporated 
within the Galapagos software itself), there are no substantial findings relating 
to whether students wanted to try alternative ways of testing theories, or 
whether they found it difficult to interpret the results of the tasks. 
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→ P' There are more materials included in the software than required for the tasks, 
allowing the possibility of motivated students exploring further. 
 There is no evidence in the evaluations, however, that this was sufficient 
motivation. On the contrary, many students reported spending longer on the 
assigned tasks than they had expected. 
It is difficult to see value in the Popperian analysis method from a single case study, 
so we now identify the learning mechanisms in further software packages, before 
considering advantages of the method. 
5.2 Jape 
The second illustration of learning mechanisms comes from a program called “Jape”, 
which is used by Computer Science undergraduates to learn formal logic. The analysis 
here is based on Aczel et al (2003). 
 
Figure 6: The software Jape is a kind of “proof calculator” 
What does the software enable students to do?  
Jape enables students to see the effects of applying a rule to a line of a natural deduction 
proof. 
The software presents a conjecture to students. For example: 
 
Figure 7: Example of a conjecture in Jape 
The students then select, from a menu, a rule to apply to a part of the proof. 
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Figure 8: Rules menu in Jape 
So, in this instance, when the optimal rule in this situation is applied, the screen 
shows the students the consequence: 
   and then…    
And so on… 
       
A big advantage of Jape is that students can consider many more examples than 
would be possible on paper, because there is no writing or drawing to do; another big 
advantage is that the software calculates the effect of rules accurately. 
Popperian Analysis 
The main problem is: 
P: How can proof e jectures in first order 
Figure 9: Proving in Jape 
s b constructed for con
propositional and predicate logics? 
→ P The software presents an implicit challenge to see how many proofs can be 
completed. The evaluation also established that because stud
Jape after practice on paper, they are often so relieved at no l
ents typically use 
onger having to 
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draw out proofs laboriously that they start to enjoy the challenge. However, in 
ngest motivation here is likely to be the exam… 
ncouraged by ease of testing (see →EE) and by careful 
 
illegal moves  done accidentally) 
and inhibits the
kind of brute 
→ EE o apply in a 
 
 
 
 
he evaluation clearly showed that Jape very often 
→ P’ 
truth, the stro
→ T Theory creation is e
sequencing of conjectures. The software also prevents users from making
 (whereas on paper, illegal moves are often
m from making certain unhelpful moves. 
 The evaluation provides details of students’ difficulties in grasping the target 
problems and theories. In particular, it is clear that while the software helps 
those students who start with certain basic strategic theories to improve upon 
these (their proving skills progress noticeably), those students who start 
without these rudimentary strategic theories tend to resort to a 
trial-and-error approach of selecting rules more or less at random. This 
approach is unable to help them move to the target strategic theories (proving 
skills do not progress). 
Students are able to test their theories about the best rule t
situation, because Jape provides instant feedback on the effects of the rule, and
provides subtle visual cues that a proof is heading in the right direction. The 
software also frees the student from drawing, and this allows experimentation.
A clear weakness of the error-elimination mechanisms is that because the 
software always takes on the task of applying the logic rules, the students then
find it difficult to fend for themselves on paper. Another weakness is that 
sometimes the feedback does not help the students debug their strategic 
theories. Nevertheless, t
allows students to discover flaws in their fixated reasoning. 
Students are able to enter their own conjectures. There is evidence from the 
evaluation that only a tiny proportion of students did so. 
5.3 Homer CD-ROM 
 
Figure 10: Screenshot from Homer CD-ROM 
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The third example is a multimedia resource about the poems of Homer and their social 
context, and it is used in the second-level course Homer: Poetry and Society (course code 
A295). This analysis is based on Chambers & Rae (1999). 
What does the software enable students to do? 
• Access in one place texts, activities, photos, maps, audio, video and other 
resources, relating to the Homeric poems and to archaeological sites of 
Ancient Greece. It contains around 700 000 words of text, about 300 images, 
22 video clips and 70 minutes of audio. 
• Search, bookmark, and make notes; enables easier engagement with texts. 
• Test their own understanding via interactive questions 
    
ROM 
Popperian 
P W
Figure 11: More screenshots from the Homer CD-
Analysis 
hat are the relationships between : poetry and society at the 
time of Homer? 
Note that we do not have information on studen
matter, nor on how the text or activities have b
learning. So we can but conjecture the learning m
→ P The software aims to motivate this p
multimedia resources and prompts pro
 As with the Galapagos and Jape soft
are chosen by the course designer no
software, the evaluation does not set ou
software might be motivating target 
theories. 
→ T Students ar means of interactive 
questions. So e are multiple-
choice; some entail students making notes; and some involve comparisons, 
particularly between passages of text. Encouragement to construct theories is 
also supported by the convenient way in which a range of resources that would 
otherwise be difficult to compare are gathered together and made accessible 
through searching. 
ts’ particular difficulties with this subject 
een constructed to address these aspects of 
echanisms. 
roblem by means of the richness of the 
vided by the interactive questions. 
ware, the problems of the Homer software 
t the student. As with the Galapagos 
t to provide evidence as to how the 
problems by challenging students’ prior 
e encouraged to construct strategic theories by 
me questions ask for one-word answers; som
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 As with the Galapagos software, the evaluations do not set out to provide 
→ EE o 
check theories. For exam ice questions force students to 
consider how to weed out wrong answers; the multimedia resources then 
e 
e 
5.4 Sim
insight into students’ typical conceptual difficulties. 
 The interactive questions encourage students to use a range of resources t
ple, the multiple cho
enable these error-elimination steps to be carried out; and finally the software 
shows an expert’s response to the question, and hints as to what counts as 
relevant evidence in the academic community. 
 As with the Galapagos software, the evaluations do not set out to examine th
success of feedback provided by the software in moving students towards 
target theories. However, a difference between the Homer and Galapagos 
packages is that the Homer software makes the multimedia resources available 
from the start, which opens up more possibilities for error-elimination; whil
the Galapagos software constrains the range of resources at each question, 
which focuses student attention on the principal error-elimination steps. 
→ P’ It is hoped that students are suitably inspired by the examples to consider their 
own questions. 
City 
 
Figure 12: A SimCity movie 
ation game SimCity allows the user to build and run a city, and it manages to
he excitement and importance of what might otherwise be seen as dull issue
oning, transport policies, budgets for leisure facilities, and so on. 
The simul  
highlight t s of 
business z
 des  
the third l s and Technology (course code AT308) in that students watch, 
in movie mode, examples of how housing, employment and transport infrastructure can 
interact. 
Popperian Analysis 
P: How are the physical forms of cities influenced by 
As cribed in Chambers & Rae (2000), SimCity has been used in a limited way in
evel course Citie
technology? 
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It does not take sophisticated pedagogical analysis to calculate that students are likely to 
gain more from a tailored interactive version of SimCity than from a movie version. 
Indeed, the software is apparently widely used on US undergraduate city planning and 
economics courses. Note too that the evaluation does not provide information on 
students’ particular difficulties with this subject matter. However, Popperian analysis is 
used here to draw attention to specific suggestions with respect to the problem above. 
→ P Could provide opportunities for competitive and collaborative “playing” and 
model designing. Rather than posing a problem in words, particular scenarios 
could be created to enable students to identify the problem for themselves. 
→ T Could allow students to test claims by building their own cities or their own 
models, with different technologies becoming available (or not) at different 
moments in history. Sequencing from simple to complex could also help here. 
→ EE Students could be asked to apply theoretical principles to range of simulated 
situations; or to apply ingle case; or to critique and 
improve upon the mode
ires, provides 
ins
Even disease and wise old philosophers can be modelled. 
These simulation games are now playable online, which opens up the possibilities for 
on simultaneously more social (thus modelling the growth of 
rately) and more sophisticated (allowing for human critical and 
aesthetic jud  the Homer 
problem. 
Lest the idea be formed that this an ly leading to identifying limitations 
D83
Lyceum is  
multiple ent 
tion
a 
a range of theories to a s
ls underlying SimCity. 
→ P' Once caught up in the spirit of the enquiry, students might very likely choose 
to explore scenarios with unusual physical or technological features. 
Another well-known and well-designed simulation game, Age of Emp
ight into historical situations. Rather than telling how the Athenians managed to 
defend their city from the Spartans for so long, students can be given the same troops, 
technologies, and resources; and they will re-invent the Athenians’ strategies for 
themselves. 
making error-eliminati
knowledge more accu
gments to play a role). Perhaps this provides a way forward for
alysis is simp
of existing software and new ways to extol the virtues of new technologies, it should be 
pointed out that the method also engenders criticisms of suggested enhancements. It is 
possible, for example, that students end up just playing games. The details of how 
activities are constrained in such a way as to make the learning mechanisms most 
effective need to be carefully tested out. 
5.5 3 using Lyceum 
 a Windows-based online synchronous audio-conferencing system. It includes
rooms, a collaborative whiteboard, voting, and collaborative docum
annota . 
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Figure 13: Lyceum facilities 
Lyceum l Practice: 
Negotia  based on 
Thorpe (
• n nine 2-
• ofile’ and 
Popperian A
P
 has been used in the postgraduate social science course Environmenta
ting Policy in a Global Society (course code D833). This analysis is
2002) and Price (2003). 
What does the software enable students to do? 
Engage in a simulation of negotiations at the UN, participating i
hour negotiation sessions 
o Take part in working groups and plenaries 
o Collaborate on documents 
o Use “whisper spaces” to conduct private negotiations 
o Take part in formal votes 
Represent the interests of a country, drawing on a ‘country pr
online resources 
nalysis 
: What are the processes of international negotiation of legal 
instruments on the environment? 
→ P The simulation, particularly the fact that all students play a distinctiv le, 
certainly engages atten oints out, though, there is a 
difference between playing the role of a diplomat and learning to be a scholar 
in the social sciences. So, for example, alliances seemed to be formed on the 
basis of personalities rather than geopolitics (Price, 2003). It is therefore an 
tion. As Thorpe (2002) p
e ro
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important role for the teaching materials and the tutor to encourage students to 
refine the scope of problems in an appropriate academic manner. There is little 
evidence available, though, about how successful this was. 
→ T Students are able to experiment with and examine the processes of negotiation 
gested that students found the 
si
(P
oppo here is little evidence 
availa  e extent to which 
the sim a  account. 
→ EE Stude ngly indicated that the simulation 
“f
th een theory and practice” (Price, 2003). In principle, the 
si sequent discussion provide opportunities for a range of 
 theories to be generated and illustrated. However, the evaluations 
o test students’ academic understanding of processes of error-
ents 
research. In thi there might be a role for 
→  
Up un y 
individual
When ana
social con
In Pop ted UN conference 
g in  
communit tested 
issues; pro s 
are noted; t 
to compro
initiate th
discussed yet 
ulated 
negotiatio d 
UN. These
Despit  
analysis h  
However,  
extent of t 
domain. 
Incide
sses of 
ractice 
by approx playing a peripheral role 
wit
in the light of theory. The evaluations sug
mulation very useful in enhancing their understanding of the target theories 
rice, 2003). In principle, the simulation and subsequent discussion provide 
rt tuni ies for a range of theories to be generated. T
as the case, or about thble, though, about whether this w
ul tion takes students’ typical theories and difficulties into
nt opinions about the course stro
ostered a great sense of community” and helped them “think reflexively on 
e relationship betw
mulation and sub
criticisms of
did not aim t
elimination in the domain. There is a danger in such simulations that stud
give priority to empirical data from the simulation rather than from wider 
s regard then, as with →P mechanisms, 
the materials and tutor in focusing students’ attention. 
 P' It is plausible that new problems arise naturally out of the engagement, 
although there are no examples available at this time. 
til now in this paper, the analysis has largely focused on the construction b
s of World 2 knowledge, in social contexts that include World 3 knowledge. 
lysing Lyceum, however, it is possible, following Vygotsky, to focus on the 
struction of World 3 knowledge. 
perian terms, the community of participants in the simula
dealin  theories about environmental issues has analogies with the wider scientific
y looking at these issues. Scientific evidence is brought to bear on con
blems are raised to do with the limitations of available evidence; contradiction
 there is competition but also a recognition that cooperation and a commitmen
mise can benefit all; and it is even within the power of these delegates to 
e collection of more evidence. Within the simulation, theories might be 
that conflict with those accepted or rejected in the wider community, and 
the reality of these idiosyncratic theories cannot be denied in understanding the sim
n processes because of the consequences for what is agreed in the simulate
 local theories are therefore taken to be part of World 3. 
e the innovative nature of this use of audio-conferencing software, Popperian
as suggested some possible limitations with respect to the target problem.
how serious these limitations are is unclear without empirical research into the
students’ difficulties, particularly in grasping error-elimination in this subjec
ntally, the “social practice” interpretation of Figure 5, mentioned earlier, would 
provoke an alternative way of looking at the use of Lyceum to teach proce
international negotiation. In this interpretation, students are being initiated into a p
imating the actual epistemological practice rather than 
hin it. Such an approximation would therefore be strengthened by realistic modelling 
of the power relations that exist between participants. 
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6 Using the analysis 
We
 that, with the exception of D833, they allow little room for the student to 
init
 discussion (D833) can be learning 
mechanisms for →TT. Opportunities for error-elimination have been provided by 
ware fee ponses (Galapagos, Homer, Jape), resource banks (Homer, 
3 833). However, the scope for error-elimination in all the 
programs has been constrained by the designers, both in terms of the types of error-
uish the fertility of different characterisations? 
One su s  
suggest en
Sup he Galapagos CD-ROM, “How would 
introduc  ing or 
engagin n ith others could help the problem to become a concern for 
students h udents to seek 
clarifica n ight 
be argu  t 
domain  e se new problems. 
lternating watching or reading and practical activities” 
 have now considered several examples of applying the method. The approach has 
been broad-brush, and ideally one should have looked at students’ detailed problem 
situations rather than whole software packages. But why are we doing this? 
First of all, it is to understand how learning is occurring. So, for example, we have 
seen some learning mechanisms for →P: 
• providing an authentic account of the historical context (Galapagos, Homer) 
• emphasising the fallibility of a researcher (Galapagos) 
• prompting (Galapagos, Jape, Homer) 
• providing a rich multimedia experience (Galapagos, Homer, SimCity) 
• exam (Jape) 
• a game-like environment (SimCity) 
• pacing and a sense of achievement (Galapagos, Jape, Homer, SimCity) 
• alternating watching or reading with practical activities (Galapagos, D833) 
• discussion (D833) 
We have also seen some difficulties with the mechanisms in these programs, in 
particular
iate problems and to formulate them in her or his own way. In addition, the programs 
have varied in the degree to which they appear to take account of students’ typical 
strategic theories and difficulties. 
Furthermore, we have seen how inferential questions (Galapagos, Homer), narrative 
(Galapagos), sequencing (Jape, Galapagos), search (Homer), consequentiality (Jape, 
SimCity), simulation (Galapagos, D833, SimCity) and
soft dback on res
D8 3) and discussion (D
elimination integrated into the software and in terms of the range of feedback achievable. 
Moreover, none of the programs provides much encouragement for problem-posing 
following error-elimination. 
Nevertheless, there is any number of ways of characterising the success of such 
software. What would enable us to disting
gge tion is that any such characterisation should help us to devise and evaluate
ed hancements to the software. 
pose, for instance, the question is asked of t
ing peer-to-peer discussion be helpful?” One response might be that observ
g i  discussion w
 w o are not already taken with it. It could encourage st
tio  of strategic theories they are worried about. It probably would not (it m
ed) help their comprehension of error-elimination appropriate to the subjec
, or ncourage them to po
So the method has generated some specific claims. These claims are likely to be 
contested by others involved in the design team; but they are specific claims about a 
possible innovation and so can be tested empirically. 
One could also consider the potential for copying learning mechanisms between 
programs. For example, perhaps “a
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mig
tegic theories. Strengthening students’ ability to test such 
the
o conduct their own analysis of a 
situ
r maybe the claim that the →EE 
me
mputer, expert walkthroughs, interviews about 
stud
ht help students using Jape; or maybe “emphasising the fallibility of a researcher” 
might help students of Homer. For example, just as the stories of Darwin and later 
scientists provided a means to draw attention to changing methods of error-elimination in 
the study of species, the changing perceptions of Homer and the poetry might highlight 
how methods of critical engagement in the academic study of this field have changed. 
In the case of the Homer CD-ROM, some successful learning mechanisms already 
within it could be built upon. The success of the Galapagos CD-ROM in alternating 
watching and reading with practical activities, and in a strong narrative line divided into 
episodic structured tasks might well be worth applying more fully in the Homer CD-
ROM to aid creation of stra
ories might prove more difficult here than in the Galapagos CD-ROM or in Jape, 
because the arguments are less easily reduced to quantitative or systematic 
representations. So finding ways to combine the CD-ROM with some form of structured 
discussion with experts might be helpful. 
Another example arises if a member of the design team found the proposed learning 
mechanism →EE for the Galapagos CD-ROM to be weak. The question would then 
naturally arise “So how could we enable students to appreciate what error-elimination 
might mean with respect to the theory of natural selection?” The course team could 
brainstorm this pedagogical question, and come up with some suggestions. So, for 
example, it might be suggested that students could be connected to a live expert at an 
appropriate point, or that that students would be asked t
ation similar to that of the finches without the structured tasks provided as support. 
And then these suggestions could be tested out with prospective students, using mock-
ups, phenomenographic interviews or whatever. O
chanism is weak might be disputed and put to the test. 
So the method is again helping to structure pedagogical debate and provide testable 
hypotheses. Testing the hypotheses is not trivial, of course, but not impossible either; and 
they are generated by educators’ understanding of students’ difficulties and of a range of 
possible teaching strategies. It is not claimed that this Popperian analysis is the only way 
to structure pedagogical debate. 
7 Extending evaluations to provide insight into learning mechanisms 
Evaluations of educational software, even if thorough, would not of course be focused on 
this style of analysis. Such evaluations are expected to find out about issues such as 
students’ perceptions of the value of software as a whole, the study time spent on it, 
interface usability, technical difficulties, and the “fit” with other aspects of the course. 
These evaluations typically make use of a variety of techniques, such as surveys, 
observations of students working at the co
ents’ perceptions of the software, and test scores. As we have seen with the 
evaluations used here, such techniques can in fact provide some evidence about the extent 
to which planned learning mechanisms meet with success, even if this is not the overt 
goal. Typically, students generally rated the software activities as interesting, enjoyable, 
and helpful for learning and remembering; and they particularly valued the interactivity 
of the learning experience and the “high production values” of the visual presentation. 
What evidence is missing, then, from even thorough evaluations of this software that 
would augment a Popperian analysis? 
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One kind of evidence is of the extent to which students have accurately grasped the 
target problems and theories of the course. This evidence could be sought using clinical 
interviews and detailed script analysis, and would allow a good test of the intended 
lea
c, but would allow researchers to build an evidence base 
in relation to learning mechanisms in general. 
Beyond this, Popperian analysis would want studies to obtain evidence relating to 
e
• To what extent are the intellectual problems those of the student, rather than 
Lim
Open U ve
level of t
has app
all the s w
Thir ,
would n
studies; the
technolo ca
to look  learning 
mechanisms
rning mechanisms described above, and would also identify students’ typical theories 
and difficulties with the topic. Another kind of evidence is of the effect of variants of 
contended aspects of the design on students’ grasp of these problems and theories. Such 
evidence would not only provide insight for the designers into suggested enhancements to 
the teaching of the particular topi
qu stions such as: 
just of the course designers? 
• In what ways are the target problems motivated by challenges to students’ 
prior theories? 
• How is autonomous trial-and-error-elimination encouraged? 
• To what extent does feedback provided by the software help students to 
improve their theories? 
• In what ways does the software help students to appreciate knowledge 
practices in the domain? 
• How does the software encourage students to pose new problems? 
8 Critique 
itations of this paper 
In this introduction to Popperian analysis, it has been illustrated how the method can be 
applied in broad terms. There are some limitations to this account, though. 
Firstly, only the broad brush problem situations of the given topics have been 
considered, rather than the detailed problem situations that an educational software 
designer or researcher would need to consider. Much of the detail about the context of 
use that crucially affects the practical effectiveness of software has been neglected. This 
is acceptable here, though because the analysis is not per se about effectiveness in 
practice, but about learning mechanisms in theory. 
Secondly, the focus has largely been on desktop software, and a fairly limited range 
of that . too This is because such technology seems to be the best analysed within the 
ni rsity in terms of subject domain knowledge (and consequently provides the 
 de ail needed about problems, theories and error-elimination). But the method 
licability across the field of educational technology. It should also be noted that 
oft are examined here has been upgraded since evaluation. 
dly  the studies cited contain some – but not all – of the empirical detail one 
eed to carry out a detailed Popperian analysis. This is not to criticise those 
y typically and quite rightly focus on the extent to which the particular 
gi l innovation achieved educational aims, and they do not usually have a remit 
 systematically and in depth at students’ difficulties and hypothesised
.  
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Finally, the style of analysis has been much simplified, focusing on aspects that are 
easiest to grasp. In particular the most basic problem-solving model has been used. 
Nevertheless, it might be possible to have seen some value in exploring Popperian 
 to try to understand learning situations. 
Yet despite these possible limitations, the value of exploring the approach is to 
ning can take us: 
quations using a Computerised Balance Model: A Popperian 
e of constraint and consequentiality as 
analysis as a possible means
Possible limitations of the method 
The advantages of the method have been made clear: it is a systematic analytical 
technique for clarifying and testing pedagogical purposes and strategies; it highlights 
students’ prior knowledge and motivation, and their learning journeys; it emphasises 
discipline knowledge; and it avoids the caricatures of transmission versus construction. 
Nonetheless, some limitations of the method are starting to appear. 
Firstly, it appears to work best in detailed problem situations, and so it lends itself 
better to assessing how variations in the design of a technology might be effective for a 
given problem situation than to assessing how a given technology might be effective for a 
variety of problem situations. 
Secondly, the method does not work well with software that does not incorporate 
substantive curriculum problems or theories with which students are expected to engage. 
Email and concept-mapping software are examples. 
Thirdly, it does not take account of meta-cognitive strategies (e.g. self-reflection) or 
preferences for learning; and it provides no special techniques for analysing language the 
mediating role of tools in activity, or the life of communities. This suggests it could be 
used in conjunction with a framework such as activity theory. 
Fourthly, it can be hard to operationalise the method in strictly procedural terms – in 
the style of cognitive modelling – which is an issue if one wants to make and test old-
fashioned claims about prerequisites, sequencing, chunking or exercises. 
Finally, it is not clear to what extent strategic theories and concerns are 
manifestations of situated cognition that do not transfer easily between problem 
situations. 
discover how far a single vision of lear
“The theory of knowledge which I wish to propose is a largely Darwinian 
theory of the growth of knowledge. From the amoeba to Einstein, the growth of 
knowledge is always the same: we try to solve our problems, and to obtain, by 
a process of elimination, something approaching adequacy in our tentative 
solutions.” (Popper, 1972) 
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